Although religious right was so carefully, so explicitly, and so completely, excluded from the cognizance of the national government by the people when that government was made, yet it is a fact that the national government, in all its branches, has directly and explicitly assumed cognizance of religion, instead of allowing religion to remain as the fathers and the Constitution left it-"avowedly the attribute of man, and not of a corporation." The government of the United States has once more made it avowedly the attribute of a corporation and not of man. Instead of maintaining the "new order of things" to which by its great seal the nation stands pledged, the government of the United States has gone back to the old order of things which it was the purpose of our governmental fathers to escape. In other words, and in short, there has been wrought a counter-revolution.
This counter-revolution was accomplished in a. d. 1892. It began, and in principle was consummated, in the Supreme Court of the United States in a decision rendered February 29, 1892.
The said decision came forth in this way: 9 In 1887 Congress enacted a law forbidding any alien to come to this country under contract to perform labor or service of any kind. The reason of that law was that large contractors and corporations in the United States would send agents to Europe to employ the lowest of the people whom they could get to come over and work. They pay their expenses to this country, and, because of this, require them to work at so much the smaller wages after they arrived. This was depreciating the price that Americans should receive for their labor, and therefore Congress enacted a law as follows:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after the passage of this act it shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its Territories, or the District of Columbia, under contract or agreement, parol or special, expressed or implied, made previous to the importation or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States, its Territories, or the District of Columbia."
Trinity Church corporation, in New York City, employed a preacher in England to come over here and preach for them. They contracted with him before he came. He was an alien, and came under contract to perform service for that church. The United States District Attorney entered suit against the church for violating this law. The United States Circuit Court decided that the church was guilty, and rendered judgment accordingly. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, first upon the correct and well-established principle that "the intent of the lawmaker is the law." The court quoted directly from the reports of the Senate Committee and the House Committee who had the bill in charge when it was put through Congress; and these both said in express terms that the term "laborer," or "labor or service," used in the statue, was intended to mean only manual labor or service, and not professional service of any kind. For instance, the Senate Committee said:
"The committee report the bill back without amendment, although there are certain features thereof which might well be changed or modified, in the hope that the bill may not fail of passage during the present session. Especially would the committee have otherwise recommended amendments, substituting for the expression 'labor and service,' whenever it occurs in the body of the bill, the words 'manual labor' or 'manual service,' as sufficiently broad to accomplish the purposes of the bill, and that such amendments would remove objections which a sharp and perhaps, unfriendly criticism may urge to the proposed legislation. The committee, however, believing that the bill in its present form will be construed as including only those whose labor or service is manual in character, and being very desirous that the bill become a law before the adjournment, have reported the bill without change."-6059 Congressional Record, 48th Congress.
Such being the plainly declared intent of the law, by those who made it, and at the time of the making of it, there was nothing left for the Supreme Court to do but to give effect to the law as it was intended, by reversing the decision of the court below. And in all reason, when the court had thus made plain the intent of the law, this was all that was necessary to the decision of the case.
But instead of stopping with this that was all-sufficient, the court took up a line of reasoning(?) by which it would reach the same point from another direction, and then, as the result of each and of both, decided what the true intent of the law was, and reversed the decision of the lower, court accordingly. And never were the aptness and wisdom of that piece of advice which Abraham Lincoln once gave to a friend, "Never say what you need not, lest yon be obliged to prove what you cannot," more completely illustrated than in this unnecessary line of argument which was pursued by the Supreme Court of the United States in this decision of February 29, 1892.
The court unanimously declared that "this is a religious people," "a religious nation," and even "a Christian nation," and that such is "the voice of the entire people." In support of these declarations the court offered considerable argument, which will be noticed presently. But the first thing to be noted is that, whether the court supported the declarations with considerable argument or with none at all, it had no shadow of right to make any such declarations.
By the whole history of the making of the Constitution, by its spirit, and by its very letter, the government of the United States, and, therefore, the Supreme Court as a coördinate branch of the government, is precluded from declaring or arguing in favor of the Christian religion, or any religion whatever. Let it not be forgotten that James Madison, in persuading the Virginia convention to ratify the Constitution, gave the assurance that "there is not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation." 10 Whereas it is certain that in the declarations set forth, in the argument conducted, in the citations made, and in the conclusion reached, in this decision, the Supreme Court did "intermeddle with religion," and in so doing did that which it had "not a shadow of right" to do.
The first words of the court in this line are as follows:-
"But beyond all these matters no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any legislation, State or national, because this is a religious people. This is historically true. From the discovery of this continent to the present hour there is a single voice making this affirmation."
Every citizen of the United States knows that it is not true, either historically or otherwise, that this is a religious people. Not even a majority of the people are religious. There is not a single city in the United States in which the people are religious-no, not a single town or village.
That is to say, this was so up to the time of the rendering of this decision, February 29, 1892. Since that of course the people are religious, because the Supreme Court says so. To be sure, some of our neighbors, and many other people whom we meet, do not know that they are religious people, as they have never chosen to be so, and do not profess it at all; but all that makes no difference. The Supreme Court of the United States has by, unanimous decision, declared that they are religious people, and it must be so whether they know it or not.
Nor is this all. The court not only declares that this is a "religious nation," but that it is a "Christian nation." The people, therefore, are not only religious but they are Christians-yes, Jews, infidels, and all. For is not the Supreme Court the highest judicial authority in the United States? and what this court declares to be the law, is not that the law? and when this court lays it down as the supreme law-as the meaning of the Constitution-that the people are religious, and are Christians, then does not that settle the question?-Not at all. The very absurdity of the suggestion only demonstrates that the court can have nothing at all to do with any such matters, and shows how completely the court transcended its powers and went out of the right way. No; men are not made religious by law, nor by judicial decision, nor by historical precedents.
The statement that "from the discovery of this continent to the present hour there is a single voice," making the affirmation that this nation is a religious people, is equally wide of the mark, for at the time of the making of this national government there was a new, fresh voice heard contradicting the long, dismal monotone of the ages, and declaring for this new nation that it "is not in any sense founded upon the Christian religion," and that it can never of right have anything to do with religion-that it has "not a shadow of right to intermeddle with religion," and that "its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation." And this voice it was which gave rise to the "new order of things" for this country and for the world. Let the reader think for only a moment of the history presented in the preceding chapter, and then explain, if he can, how the court could make such a statement as this which we have quoted and commented upon-remembering at the same time, too, that "every case is discussed by the whole body [of the court] twice over-once to ascertain the opinion of the majority, which is then directed to be set forth in a written judgment; then again, when that written judgment, which one of the judges has prepared, is submitted for criticism and adoption as the judgment of the court."-Bryce, American Commonwealth, chap. 22, par. 4.
The Argument from European Nations
After this deliverance the court proceeds to cite historical evidences to prove the proposition that this is a "religious people" and a "Christian nation." The first is as follows:-
"The commission to Christopher Columbus, prior to his sail westward, is from 'Ferdinand and Isabella, by the grace of God, king and queen of Castile,' etc., and recites that 'it is hoped that by God's assistance some of the continents and islands in the ocean will be discovered,' etc."
What religion did Ferdinand and Isabella have in mind when they issued that document? What religion did they profess? And what religion did they possess, too?-The Catholic religion, to be sure. And not only that, it was the Catholic religion with the Inquisition in full swing; for it was Ferdinand and Isabella who established the Inquisition in Spain under the generalship of Torquemada, and who, because Spain was a "Christian nation," sentenced to confiscation of all goods and to banishment every Jew who would not turn Catholic. 11 And by virtue of such religious activity as this Ferdinand and Isabella fairly earned as an everlasting reward, and by way of preeminence, the title of "THE CATHOLICS." And this is the first piece of "historical" authority by which the Supreme Court of the United States adjudges American citizens "to be a religious people," and by which that court decides that this is a "Christian nation."
Now that is quoted to prove that this is a "religious people" and a "Christian nation," and it is declared that this language, of Ferdinand and Isabella, and the language of the Constitution of the United States, "have one meaning."
Then, in view of that quotation and this decision, should it be wondered at if the Catholic Church should claim that this is so indeed, and should demand favors from the government as such? Everybody knows that the Catholic Church already is not slow to take part in political questions, to interfere with the government, and to have the government recognize the Catholic Church and give it every year from the public treasury nearly $400,000 of the money of all the people. The people know that this is already the case. And now when this Catholic document is cited by the Supreme Court to prove this a Christian nation; and when that court declares that this document and the Constitution have one meaning, should it be thought strange if the Catholic Church should claim that that is correct, and act upon it.
However, it is not denominational or sectarian Christianity that the court proposes to recognize as the national religion here, but, as was attempted in Virginia, simply "Christianity, general Christianty." Accordingly, British documents are next quoted which designate the "true Christian faith" as professed in the Church of England in colonial times. And here is the quotation:-
"The first colonial grant, that made to Sir Walter Raleigh in 1584, was from 'Elizabeth, by the grace of God; of England, Fraunce, and Ireland, queene, Defender of the Faith,' etc.; and the grant authorized him to enact statutes for the government of the proposed Colony; Provided, That 'they be not against the true Christian faith now professed in the Church of England.' ... Language of a similar import may be found in the subsequent charters, ... and the same is true of the various charters granted to other colonies. In language more or less emphatic, is the establishment of the Christian religion declared to be one of the purposes of the grant." 12
It is true that the "establishment of the Christian religion was one of the purposes" of all these grants. But are the American people still bound by the purposes and intentions of Queen Elizabeth and her British successors? Does Britain still rule America, that the intent and purposes of British sovereigns shall be held binding upon the American people?-Nay, nay. After all these documents were issued there was the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence, by which it was both declared and demonstrated that these Colonies are and of right ought to be free and independent States-free and independent of British rule, and the intents and purposes of British sovereigns in all things, religious as well as civil. And then after that the national Constitution was formed, expressly repudiating "establishments of the Christian religion."
It is true that the "establishment of the Christian religion was one of the purposes" of these grants. But shall the Constitution of the United States count for nothing, when it positively prohibits any religious test, and any establishment of religion of any kind? Shall the supreme law of this nation count for nothing in its solemn declaration that "the government of the United States is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion"? Has the Supreme Court of the United States the right to supplant the supreme law of this land with the intents and purposes of the sovereigns of England? Is the Supreme Court of the United States the interpreter of the supreme law of the United States? or is it the interpreter of the intents and purposes of the sovereigns of England, France, and Ireland, "Defenders of the Faith"?
It is true that "the establishment of the Christian religion was one of the purposes" of these grants, and that purpose was accomplished in the Colonies settled under those grants. But, though all this be true, what possible bearing can that rightly have on any question under the Constitution and laws of the national government? The national system was not intended to be a continuation of 'the colonial system; on the contrary, it was intended to be distinct from both the colonial and State systems. And the chief, the very fundamental, distinction that the national system was intended to have from both the others, was in its complete separation from every idea of an establishment of religion.
And though it be true that all the Colonies except Rhode Island had establishments of "the Christian religion" in pursuance of the purpose of these British grants; and though all the States except Rhode Island and Virginia had these same establishments of "the Christian religion" when the national system was organized; yet this had no bearing whatever upon the national system except to make all the more emphatic its total separation from them all, and from every conception of an establishment of "the Christian religion."
Let us reduce to a short argument this reasoning of the court. The proposition to be proved is, "This is a Christian nation." The principal statement is, "The establishment of the Christian religion was one of the purposes" of the British grants here. We have then these two statements of the court. But this is not enough; we must know how the conclusion is derived from the principal statement,
So far the argument stands merely thus:-
(a) "The establishment of the Christian religion was one of the purposes of the British grants in America."
(b) Consequently, "this is a Christian nation."
But this will never do; there is a destructive hiatus between the antecedent and the consequent. This blank must be filled, or else there is a total absence of reasoning, and the conclusion is nothing. With what, then, shall this blank be filled? It could be filled thus:-
(a) "The establishment of the Christian religion was one of the purposes of the British grants in America."
(b) America is subject to British sovereignty.
(c) Consequently, "this is a Christian nation."
This would complete the formula, would give the conclusion something to rest upon, and would connect it with the chief statement. But the difficulty with it is that it is not true. It is not only contrary to the history and the experience of the nations concerned, but it is contrary to the argument of the court itself; for the court, in its argument, does recognize and name the Declaration of Independence and the national Constitution. This thought, then, is not allowable in the argument.
What thought, then, will fit the place and make the argument complete? There is one, and only one, possible thought that can fit the place and make the connection between the court's principal statement and its conclusion. That thought is given by the court itself as the turning point, and is indeed the pivot-the very crucial test-of the whole argument presented by the court. Here is the argument complete:-
(a) "The establishment of the Christian religion is declared to be one of the purposes of the [British] grants [in America]."
(b) This declaration and the national Constitution have one language and "one meaning." 13
(c) Consequently, "this is a Christian nation."
This and this alone is the course of reasoning by which the court reaches its conclusion that "this is a Christian nation." This is the thought, and, indeed, those are the words, of the court. The thing is accomplished solely by making the language of the Constitution bear "one meaning" with these quoted declarations, whose purpose was plainly "the establishment of the Christian religion."
But some may say. This formula encounters the same difficulty as did the other one, viz., it is not true, and is contrary to all the history and experience of the nation in the times of the making of the Constitution. It is true, as the preceding chapters of this book plainly show, that the connecting statement between the premise and the conclusion in this latter formula is, in itself, as false as is that one in the former. It is true that the Constitution was never intended to bear any such meaning as is here given to it in harmony with the declarations quoted. It was both intended and declared to bear a meaning directly the opposite of that which these declarations bear. And if any other person, persons, or tribunal, on earth (except all the people) had said that such is the meaning of the Constitution, it would have amounted to nothing. Such a statement made by the Supreme Court, however, does amount to something. And-
Here Is the Decisive Point
The Supreme Court of the United States is constitutionally authorized to interpret and declare the meaning of the Constitution. Whatever the Supreme Court says the meaning of the Constitution is, that is legally its meaning so long as said decision stands. The meaning which the court gives to the Constitution may be utterly false, as in the Dred Scott decision and in this one, but that matters nothing; the false meaning stands as firmly as though it were true, until the decision is reversed either by the Supreme Court itself, or by the higher court-the people-as was done in the matter of the Dred Scott decision, of which this decision now under consideration is a complete parallel.
Such, then, is indisputably the meaning which the Supreme Court of the United States has given to the Constitution of the United States-a meaning the purpose of which is "the establishment of the Christian religion." This is a meaning which, by every particle of evidence derivable from the makers and the making of the Constitution, is demonstrated to be directly the reverse of that which it was intended to bear and which it did bear while the makers of it lived. Therefore, as certainly as logic is logic and truth is truth, it is demonstrated that in this decision the Supreme Court of the United States has subverted the Constitution of the United States in its essential meaning as regards the Christian religion or the establishment thereof.
Nor was the court content with a little. These declarations of Ferdinand and Isabella, Elizabeth, James I., et al., were not sufficient to satisfy the zeal of the court in behalf of "Christianity, general Christianity," as the established and national religion here; but it must needs heap upon these fifteen more, from different sources, to the same purpose. Having extracted the real substance of the court's argument throughout, in the foregoing analysis, it will not be necessary for us to apply the set formula to each citation in all the long list. This the reader can readily enough do in his own mind. We shall, however, present all of the court's quotations and its application of them, with such further remarks as may be pertinent.
From Colonial Charters
Next following the citations from Ferdinand, and Isabella, Elizabeth, and the others of Britain, the court sets forth documents of the New England Puritans which also plainly declare that "the establishment of the Christian religion was one of the purposes" of their settlement in the land. Here is the language of the court and of the Puritans:-
"The celebrated compact made by the Pilgrims in the Mayflower, 1620, recites: 'Having undertaken for the glory of God and advancement of the Christian faith, and the honor of our king and country, a voyage to plant the first Colony in the northern parts of Virginia; Do by these Presents, solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better ordering and preservation and furtherance of the ends aforesaid.'
"The fundamental orders of Connecticut, under which a provisional government was instituted in 1638-1639, commence with this declaration:-
"'Forasmuch as it hath pleased the Almighty God by the wise dispensation of his diuyne pruidence so to order and dispose of things that we, the inhabitants and residents of Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield are now cohabiting and dwelling in and upon the River Conectecotte and the lands thereunto adioyneing; and well knowing where a people are gathered together the word of God requires that to mayntayne the peace and vnion of such a people there should be an orderly and decent government established according to God, to order and dispose of the affayres of the people at all seasons as occasion shall require; doe therefore associate and conioyne ourselves to be as one publike State or Comonwelth; and doe, for ourselves and our successors and such as shall be adioyned to vs att any tyme hereafter, enter into combination and confederation togather, to mayntayne and presearue the liberty and purity of the gospell of our Lord Jesus wch we now prfesse, as also the disciplyne of the churches, which according to the truth of the said gospell is now practised amongst us.'"
It is worthy of remark in this connection, that by this "historical" citation, the Supreme Court just as certainly justifies the employment of the "civil body politick" for the maintenance of the "discipline of the churches," as by this and the previous ones it establishes the Christian religion as the religion of this nation. For it was just as much and as directly the intention of those people to maintain the discipline of the churches, as it was to "preserve the liberty and purity of the gospel then practiced" among them. Indeed, it was only by maintaining the discipline of the churches that they expected to preserve "the liberty and purity of the gospell" as there and then practiced. All their history shows that they never thought, nor made any pretensions, of doing it in any other way. And, in fact, order number four of these very "fundamental orders" required that the governor of that "publike State or Comonwelth" should "be always a member of some approved congregation," and should take an oath that he would "further the execution of justice according to the rule of God's word; so help me God in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ."
We know, and it can be abundantly shown, that the maintenance of the discipline of the churches by the power of "the civil Body Politick" is precisely what the churches of the United States are aiming at, and is what they design to accomplish through the enforcement of national Sunday laws. This is what is done always in the enforcement of Sunday laws, whether State or national. And all this purpose, the Supreme Court fully sanctions and justifies in its (mis) interpretation of the national Constitution, when it declares that the language of these "fundamental orders of Connecticut" and the language of the national Constitution is "one language," "having one meaning."
The court proceeds:-
"In the charter of privileges granted by William Penn to the province of Pennsylvania, in 1701, it is recited: 'Because no People can be truly happy, though under the greatest Enjoyment of Civil Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom of their Consciences, as to their Religious Profession and Worship; And Almighty God being the only Lord of Conscience, Father of Lights and Spirits; and the Author as well as Object of all divine Knowledge, Faith, and Worship, who only doth enlighten the Minds, and persuade and convince the Understandings of People, I do hereby grant and declare,' etc."
Yes, and the same document provided that in order to "be capable to serve the government in any capacity" a person must "also profess to believe in Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the world." And according to the same document, in order to be assured that "he should in no ways be molested," etc., a person living in that province was required to "confess and acknowledge the only Almighty and Eternal God to be Creator, Upholder, and Ruler of the world."
From the Declaration of Independence
Still citing proof that this is a Christian nation, the court continues in the following queer fashion:-
"Coming nearer to the present time, the Declaration of Independence recognizes the presence of the Divine in human affairs in these words: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.' 'We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare,' etc. 'And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.'"
It is undoubtedly true that the Declaration of Independence does recognize the presence of the divine in human affairs. But it is a hazardous piece of logic to conclude from this that "this is a Christian nation." For what nation has there ever been on earth that did not recognize the presence of the divine in human affairs? But it would be rather risky to conclude from this that all nations have been and are "Christian nations."
But, it may be said, the Declaration recognized the "Creator and "the Supreme Judge of the world," as well as "Divine Providence." Yes, that is true, too. And so do the Turks, the Arabs, the Hindoos, and others; but that would hardly justify the Supreme Court or anybody else in concluding and officially declaring that Turkey, Arabia, and Hindoostan, are Christian nations.
But it may still be said that those who made this Declaration used these expressions with none other than the God of Christianity in mind. This may or may not be true, according to the way of thinking of the respective individuals who signed or espoused the Declaration. 14 But whatever these expressions may have meant to those who used them at the time, it is certain that they did not mean the Supreme Court has here made them mean. Of this we have the most positive evidence.
Thomas Jefferson was the author of the Declaration of Independence, and from that day and forward he exerted all his powers to disestablish "the true Christian faith professed in the Church of England," which, according to the purpose of Elizabeth and her successors, had been established in Virginia for more than a hundred and fifty years. When this accomplished, and an attempt was made to establish "Christianity, general Christianity," under the title of "the Christian religion," Jefferson again enlisted all his powers to defeat the attempt, and it was defeated. And to the day of his death, the one thing in all his career upon which he looked with the most satisfaction was this disestablishment of "the Christian religion" in Virginia. And now, lo! this document of which Jefferson was the author is quoted by the Supreme Court of the United States, and classed with documents "one of the purposes" of which was "the establishment, of the Christian religion;" and, as having "one meaning" with these, is used to prove a proposition with reference to this nation which Jefferson spent all his powers and the best part of his life in combating. What would Jefferson himself say to this use of his language were he here to read this decision? 15
Except in the matter of the Died Scott decision, a more perverse use of the language oft the Declaration of Independence certainly never was made than is thus made in this "Christian nation" decision, February 29, 1892.
From the States
Next the court says:-
"If we examine the constitutions of the various States, we find in them a constant recognition of religious obligations. Every constitution of every one of the forty-four States contains language which either directly or by clear implication recognizes a profound reverence for religion and an assumption that its influence in all human affairs is essential to the well-being of the community."
This is all true enough in itself; but even though it be true respecting all the States, that can have no bearing whatever in any matter respecting the nation or the national jurisdiction or the consideration of any national question. The Constitution declares that-
"The powers not delegated to the United Slates by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
When the nation was made, eleven of the States had established religions, the most of them bad slavery, and these institutions were reserved to the control of the States themselves. This is one reason why the tenth amendment was made to read as it does. These matters belonged, and were left, to the jurisdiction of the States, and with them the national government could have nothing at all to do. And so it continued, until the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, by which the control as to both slavery and established religions was prohibited to the States by the national Constitution. So that, admitting the assumption of the court that the States still have control of religion as at the beginning, the court's conclusion does not follow; because then the true argument is this; No power in, over, or concerning religion has been delegated to the United States-the nation-by the Constitution, nor has such power been prohibited by it to the States. All power and jurisdiction, therefore, in all questions and all matters of whatever kind concerning religion, are reserved and belong exclusively to the States or to the people.
But since the fourteenth amendment, this assumption even is entirely baseless. See further on this point in chapter 13.
More than this: As all power respecting religion has actually been prohibited to the United States by the Constitution, even though all the forty-four States had one and the same religion, and that specifically and by law established, this would mean absolutely nothing, and could never rightly be made to mean anything, to the United States, i. e., to the nation. The Supreme Court of the nation has no right to cite religious characteristics of the States, and then from these draw conclusions and make official declarations that the nation is "religious" or "Christian" or anything else in the way of religion. This is why Madison said that "there is not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion." And this is why he also declared that the "least interference" of the general government with religion "would be a most flagrant usurpation." This because in so doing it would be intruding into a field, and entering upon the consideration of that which is not only reserved but positively prohibited, both to the nation and to the States. 16
As no power in matters of religion has been delegated to the nation, but, on the contrary, all such power has been positively prohibited to the nation, and also to the States, so the Supreme Court of the nation was trebly precluded from drawing from the example of the States anything on the subject of religion, and was also trebly precluded from ever making any such declaration as that "this is a Christian nation." Since the fourteenth amendment the matter of religion as respects both States and nation belongs exclusively to the people.
It is worth while, however, to give the citations which the court makes from the State constitutions, that the use which the court makes of the national Constitution in connection therewith may be clearly seen. So here they arc exactly as the court sets them forth:-
"This recognition may be in the preamble, such as is found in the Constitution of Illinois, 1870: 'We, the people of the State of Illinois, grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political, and religious liberty which he hath so long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to him for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmit the same unimpaired to succeeding generations,' etc.
"It may be only in the familiar requisition that all officers shall take an oath closing with the declaration 'so help me God.' It may be in clauses like that of the constitution of Indiana, 1816, Article XI, section 4: 'The manner of administering an oath or affirmation shall be such as is most consistent with the conscience of the deponent, and shall be esteemed the most solemn appeal to God,' Or in provisions such as are found in Articles XXXVI and XXXVII of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Maryland, 1867: 'That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks most acceptable to him, all persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought, by any law, to be molested in his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace, or safely of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil, or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent or maintain or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain any place of worship, or any ministry; nor shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief: Provided, He believes in the existence of God, and that, underhis dispensation, such person will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor, either in this world or the world to come. That no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the oath prescribed by this Constitution.' Or like that in Articles II and III, of Part 1st of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780: 'It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society publicly and at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme Being, the Great Creator and Preserver of the universe.... As the happiness of a people and the good order and preservation of civil government essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality, and as these cannot be generally diffused through a community but by the institution of the public worship of God and of public instructions in piety, religion, and morality: Therefore, to promote their happiness and to secure the good order and preservation of their government, the people of this commonwealth have a right to invest their Legislature with power to authorize and require, and the Legislature shall, from time to time, authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies-politic or religious societies to make suitable provisions, at their own expense, for the institution of the public worship of Godand for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily.' Or, as in sections 5 and 14 of Article VII of the Constitution of Mississippi, 1832: "No person who denies the being of a God, or a future state of rewards and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department of this State.... Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government, the preservation of liberty, and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of education, shall forever be encouraged in this State.' Or by Article XXII of the Constitution of Delaware, 1776, which required all officers, besides an oath of allegiance, to make and subscribe the following declaration: 'I, A. R. do profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ his only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed forever more: and I do acknowledge, the Holy Scriptures of, the Old and New Testament to be given by divine inspiration.'"
And the doctrine that is held all through the decision, that these things and the Constitution speak the same language and have one meaning, is just at this point emphasized in the following words:-
"Even the Constitution of the United States, which is supposed to have little touch upon the private life of the individual, contains in the first amendment a declaration common to the constitutions of all the States, as follows: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' And also provides that the executive shall have ten days (Sundays excepted), within which to determine whether he will approve or veto a bill. [Here is a sly indication that the enforcement of Sunday observance is constitutional.]
"There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language pervading them all, having one meaning; they affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These are not individual sayings, declarations of private persons; they are organic utterances: they speak the voice of the entire people."
According to this interpretation, then, when the Constitution of the United States declares that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or, public trust under the United States," it means that "no religious test ought ever to be. required ... other than a belief in the existence of God," and of "a future state of rewards and punishments," and a profession of "faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ his only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed forevermore; and I do acknowledge the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by divine inspiration."(!!) For this is what the Constitutions of Maryland, Mississippi, and Delaware plainly mean; and these and the Constitution of the United States arc pervaded by a "universal language," "having one meaning."(!!!)
And when the Constitution of the United States declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," it means that the Congress "shall, from time to time, authorize and require the several towns, parishes, precincts and other bodies politic, or religious societies, to make suitable provisions, at their own expenses, for the institution of the public worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality in all cases where such provisions shall not be made voluntarily."!! For plainly that is what the Constitution of Massachusetts mean, and behold that and the Constitution of the United States are pervaded by "a universal language" "having one meaning."(!!!)
How the court could present such a string of quotations, every one of which distinctly contemplated an establishment of religion and the prohibition of the free exercise thereof, and then quote this clause of the national Constitution which in every feature and every intent absolutely prohibits any establishment of religion, and any interference with the free exercise thereof-how the court could do all this and then declare that "there is no dissonance" in the declarations, that they all have the same language and "one meaning," is a most astonishing thing. If such a thing had been done by any of the "common run" of American citizens, it could have been considered as nothing less than wildly absurd; but coming as it does from such a source as the Supreme Court of the whole nation; it is as far worse as could be possible. To say that it is absurd is not enough, it is simply preposterous. And yet, preposterous as it is, it is expected to, and, so far as the great mass of the people are concerned, it undoubtedly will, carry with it all the weight of supreme national law.
All this is bad enough, and preposterous enough, in itself; but there is another consideration that even magnifies it, that is, the leaving out, the complete ignoring, of all the history and all the essential facts which are pertinent to the question. Why should the court leave out Jefferson, Madison, and Washington from the place where they only and wholly belong, and drag Ferdinand, Isabella, and Elizabeth into the place where they do not and cannot by any shadow of right belong? Why should Jefferson, Madison, and Washington not only be allowed no place by the court, but be compelled by the court to give place to Ferdinand, Isabella, and Elizabeth?
Why should the purposes of Jefferson, Madison, and Washington, and the other fathers who made this nation, be completely ignored, and the purposes of Ferdinand, Isabella, Elizabeth, and the Puritans be taken up and exalted to their place? Why should all the history of the making of the national Constitution be ignored as completely as though there were no such history, and all this other stuff be taken up and discussed and approved as though this were the only historical evidence there is on the subject?
Why should the national Constitution be interpreted and construed according to the purposes of Ferdinand, Isabella, Elizabeth and her successors, the Puritans, and the constitutions of the States, instead of the purposes of Jefferson, Madison, Washington, and the other fathers who made it? Why should the real meaning which our fathers gave to the Constitution be supplanted with a meaning that is as foreign to it as the sovereigns of Spain and England are foreign to the nation itself to-day? Why should the only history that is pertinent to the question be wholly ignored, and that which in every element is absolutely impertinent be exalted and honored in its stead? 17
The language in which Abraham Lincoln characterized the position of Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott decision, and of Stephen A. Douglas in the defense of it, is the language that is most fitting to the position of the Supreme Court in this "Christian nation" decision; for here the two decisions are perfectly parallel. Lincoln's words are as follows:
"I ask, How extraordinary a thing it is that a man who has occupied a seat on the floor of the Senate [or on the bench of the Supreme Court-a. t. j.] of the United States ... pretending to give a truthful and accurate history of the slavery question [or of the question of religion and the nation-a. t. j.] in this country, should so entirely ignore the whole of that portion of our history-the most important of all! Is it not a most extraordinary spectacle that a man should stand up and ask for any confidence in his statements who sets out as he does with portions of history, calling upon the people to believe that it is a true and fair representation, when the leading part, the controlling feature, of the whole history is carefully suppressed?
"And now he asks the community to believe that the men of the Revolution were in favor of his 'great principle,' when we have the naked history that they themselves dealt with this very subject matter of his principle, and utterly repudiated his principle-acting upon a precisely contrary ground. It is as impudent and absurd as if a prosecuting attorney should stand up before a jury, and ask them to convict A as the murderer of B while B was standing alive before them."
But the court does not stop even here. Having established "the Christian religion" for "the entire people," and settled all the appurtenances thereto as within the meaning of the Constitution, the court cites and sanctions the declaration of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that "Christianity, general Christianity, is, and always has been, part of the common law," and then proceeds to sanction also the doctrine that it is blasphemy to speak or act in contempt "of the religion professed by almost the whole community." This is done by citing the pagan decision of "Chancellor Kent, the great commentator on American law, speaking as chief justice of the Supreme Court of New York," which "assumes that we are a Christian people." Here is the language of the court on that strain:-
"While because of the general recognition of this truth the question has seldom been presented to the courts, yet we find that in Updegraph versusThe Commonwealth (II Serg. and Rawle, 394, 400) it was decided that 'Christianity, general Christianity, is, and always has been, a part of the common law of Pennsylvania; ... not Christianity with an established church, and tithes, and spiritual courts, but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men.' And in The People versusRuggles (8 Johns. 290, 294, 295), Chancellor Kent, the great commentator on American law, speaking as chief justice of the Supreme Court of New York, said: 'The people of this State, in common with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity, as the rule of their faith and practice; and to scandalize the Author of these doctrines is not only, in a religious point of view, extremely impious, but, even in respect to the obligations due to society, is a gross violation of decency and good order.... The free, equal, and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion, whatever it may be, and free and decent discussions on any religious subject, is granted and secured; but to revile with malicious and blasphemous contempt, the religion professed by almost the whole community, is an abuse of that right. Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the Constitution, as some have strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately, the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of the Grand Lama; and for this plain reason, that the case assumes that we are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity, and not upon the doctrines or worship of those impostors.' And in the famous case of Vidal versus Girard's Executors (2 How. 127, 128), this court, while sustaining the will of Mr. Girard, with its provision for the creation of a college into which no minister should be permitted to enter, observed, 'It is also said, and truly, that the Christian religion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania.'"
But even though it be decided, and declared, and admitted, that "Christianity, general Christianity, is and always has been" not only a part but the whole of the common law, and the statute law also, of Pennsylvania, and that it is "blasphemy" in New York to speak or act in contempt of the established religion, that never can rightly be made to mean anything to the nation. And even though all this were a fact within the legitimate consideration of the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania, New York, and all the other State Supreme Courts in the land, it never could by any kind of right be a fact within the legitimate consideration of the Supreme Court of the nation in the construction of any national law or the decision of any national question. 18
There remains but one thing more to cover the whole ground of the old order of things, but one thing more to complete the perfect likeness of the whole papal system, and that is the direct and positive sanction of Sunday laws. Nor is this one thing lacking. As before observed, it is indirectly indicated in the quotation from the national Constitution. But the court does not stop with that; it makes Sunday laws one of the proofs that "this is a Christian nation." The words are as follows:-
"If we pass beyond these matters to a view of American life as expressed by its laws, its business, its customs, and its society, we find everywhere a clear recognition of the same truth. Among other matters, note the following: The form of oath usually prevailing, concluding with an appeal to the Almighty; the custom of opening sessions of all deliberative bodies, and most conventions, with prayer; the prefatory words of all wills, 'In the name of God, Amen; the laws respecting the observance of the Sabbath with the general cessation of all secular business, and the closing of courts, Legislatures, and other similar public assemblies on that days.... These, and many other matters which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterancesthat this is a Christian nation."
Here we may properly present in summary form again this whole discussion as presented by the Court. So stated it stands thus:-
(a) "The establishment of the Christian religion," "Christianity, general Christianity," "is one of the purposes of all these" documents.
(b) "Even the Constitution of the United States ... contains in the first amendment a declaration common to" all these; for "there is a universal language pervading them all, having one meaning; they affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation.... They are organic utterances; they speak the voice of the entire people."
(c) Conclusion: "This is a Christian nation."
And therefore the decision concludes as follows:-
"The construction ["of this statute"] invoked cannot be accepted as correct. It is a case where then,' was presented a definite evil, in view of which the Legislature used general terms with the purpose of reaching all phases of that evil, and thereafter, unexpectedly, it is developed that the general language thus employed is broad enough to reach cases and acts which the whole history and life of the country affirm could not have been intentionally legislated against. It is the duty of the courts, under those circumstances, to say that, however broad the language of the statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not within the intention of the Legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.
"The judgment will be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion."
"In accordance with this opinion" then, let us recapitulate, and see what has been done by it. "The Christian religion," that is, "Christianity, general Christianity," is legally recognized and declared to be the established religion of this nation, and that consequently "this is a Christian nation." With this also, "in language more or less emphatic," there is justified as the "meaning of the Constitution of the United States, (1) the maintenance of the discipline of the churches by the civil power; (2) the requirement of the religious oath; (3) the requirement of the religions test oath as a qualification for office; (4) public taxation for the support of religion and religious teachers; (5) the requirement of a belief in the Trinity and the inspiration of "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments;" (6) the guilt of blasphemy upon everyone who speaks or acts in contempt of the established religion; and (7) laws for the observance of Sunday, with the general cessation of all "secularbusiness."
All this is declared by unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to be the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. And what the Supreme Court says the meaning of the Constitution is, that is its meaning and that is the law until the decision is reversed. Therefore, again, we say, and it is not too much to say, as certainly as logic is logic, and truth is truth, it is demonstrated that in this decision the Supreme Court of the United States has subverted the Constitution of the United States in its essential meaning as regards the Christian religion or the establishment thereof.
Now what more was ever required by the Papacy, and all phases of the old order of things, than is thus brought within the meaning of the national Constitution by this decision? What more was ever required by the Papacy itself than that "the Christian religion" should be the national religion; that the discipline of the church should be maintained by the civil power; that the religious test oath should be applied to all; that the public should be taxed for the support of religion and religious worship; that there should be required a belief in the doctrine of the Trinity, and the inspiration of the "Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament;" that the guilt of "blasphemy" should be visited upon everyone who should speak or act "in contempt of the religion professed by almost the whole community;" and that everybody should be required bylaw to observe Sunday? Indeed, what more than this could be required or even desired by the most absolute religious despotism that could be imagined?
Therefore, it is pertinent here to inquire, Does this decision maintain the "new order of things" to which this nation stands' pledged by the great seal of the United States?-No, no, twenty times no. On the contrary, it sanctions, and restores, and fastens upon this nation, the old order of things which our revolutionary fathers hoped that we should forever escape, through their sublime efforts, which culminated in the creation of this nation and the formation of the national Constitution-as it reads, and as they meant it.
What more could be done to create the very image of the Papacy in this nation, in the principle of the thing, than is done in this decision? In principle we say; not in its positive workings, of course, because the decision in itself on this point does not bear the force of a statute that can be made at once obligatory upon all by the executive power of the nation. But it does sanction and justify beforehand any and every encroachment that the religious power may make upon the civil, and every piece of legislation that Congress might enact on the subject of religion or religious observances; so that by it the national door is opened wide for the religious element to enter and take possession in whatever way it chooses or can make effective. And there stands at the door, ready and determined to enter and take possession, the strongest religio-political combination that could be formed in the land.
Therefore we say that, although life is not by this given to this image that it should of itself speak and act (Revelation 13:15), yet so far as the makingof the evil thing, and the establishment of the principle of it are concerned, it is certainly done. The tree does not yet stand with its branches widespread, bearing its pernicious fruit, but the tree is planted. And as certainly as the branches and the fruit are all in the natural stock that is planted, and it is only a question of time when they will appear, so certainly the wide spreading branches and the pernicious fruit of the full-grown tree of religions despotism are in the evil stock of Church and State, of "the establishment of the Christian religion," that has been planted by the Supreme Court in and for this nation; and it is only a question of time when these fruits will inevitably appear.
This decision was followed in the same year, 1892, by an act of Congress declaring Sunday to be the Sabbath of the fourth commandment, instead of the seventh day, as named in the commandment, and requiring its observance at the World's Columbian Exposition. Congress did this specifically as a religious thing. And, although other things defeated the actual closing of the gates, defeated the enforcement of the law, yet that in nowise weakens the fact that this law respecting religion was enacted by Congress.
And the president, Benjamin Harrison, approved this law respecting religion. This he did under the mistaken notion that he was pledged to maintain the government of the United States, rather than the Constitution of the United States. 19
Thus in the year a. d. 1892 the government of the United States, by specific official acts of the three departments-the Judiciary, the Legislative, and the Executive-of which that government is composed, was turned from the "new order of things" to which it was committed by our revolutionary fathers, and to which it stands pledged by the great seal of the government itself, and was thrown into the evil tide of the old order of things. And thus this enlightened nation, the example and glory of the world, was caused to assume the place and the prerogatives of the governments of the Middle Ages in embodying in law the dogmas and definitions of the theologians, and executing the arbitrary and despotic will of the church.
As the acts of Congress and the executive must in any case rest for their validity upon their constitutionality; as their constitutionality or otherwise must, so far as the action of the government is concerned, rest upon a decision of the Supreme Court; and as the court in this Christian nation decision has already practically decided beforehand every such question; this makes this decision the pivot of the whole question of an established national religion, as against the perfect freedom of religious right as the meaning of the Constitution and the right of mankind.
For this reason we confine ourselves to the discussion of the decision and the principles involved.
Note.-For a full history and discussion of the Act of congress above referred to, see "Two Republics," pp. 801-826.